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ABSTRACT
Under the New Basel Accord bank capital adequacy rules (Pillar 1) are substantially revised but the
introduction of two new "Pillars" is, perhaps, of even greater significance. This paper focuses on
Pillar 2 which expands the range of instruments available to the regulator when intervening with
banks that are capital inadequate and investigates the complementarity between Pillar 1 (risk-based
capital requirements) and Pillar 2. In particular, the paper focuses on the role of closure rules when
recapitalization is costly. In the model banks are able to manage their portfolios dynamically and
their decisions on recapitalization and capital structure are determined endogenously. A feature of
our approach is to consider the costs as well as the benefits of capital regulation and to accommodate
the behavioral response of banks in terms of their portfolio strategy and capital structure. The paper
argues that problems of capital adequacy are minor unless, in at least some states of the world, banks
are able to violate the capital adequacy rules. The paper shows how the role of Pillar 2 depends on
the effectiveness of capital regulation, i.e., the extent to which banks can "cheat".
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1 Introduction
Under the New Basel Accord bank capital adequacy rules (Pillar 1) are sub-
stantially revised but the introduction of two new dimensions to the regula-
tory framework is, perhaps, of even greater signiﬁcance. Pillar 2 increases the
number of instruments available to the regulator: (i) intensifying monitor-
ing; (ii) restricting the payment of dividends; (iii) requiring the preparation
and implementation of a satisfactory capital adequacy restoration plan; (iv)
requiring the bank to raise additional capital immediately. Pillar 3 enhances
disclosure (that is, publicly available information). This paper investigates
the consequences of adding Pillar 2 alongside Pillar 1 in terms of bank risk
taking and the scale of bank lending. The results suggest that Pillar 2 should
more properly be seen as a substitute for, rather than a complement to Pillar
1 and that, in particular, Pillar 2 aﬀects bank risk taking only when Pillar 1
rules cannot be eﬀectively enforced.
If regulators are able to enforce a risk-based capital requirements rule at
all times, then both failure and, consequently, calls on the deposit insurance
fund can be eﬀectively eliminated. In this case the details of the rule are of
little importance because, as soon as capital reaches some lower threshold1
the regulator simply has to force the bank to invest entirely in riskless assets.
Under these conditions additional regulatory instruments such as Pillars 2
and 3 would have no role2. Thus, the design of capital requirements is a
signiﬁcant problem only in the case when the regulator is either unable to
observe the bank’s portfolio perfectly or lacks the authority to force changes
1The conclusion that continuous monitoring and perfect liquidity would eliminate the
possibility of default rests on the assumption of asset price continuity, i.e., the absence of
jumps. In the context of a single obligor this assumption is indeed critical but, for banks
with large well diversiﬁed portfolios, the conclusion is much more robust in the sense that
a jump in the value of a claim on a single counterpart would have only a small eﬀect on
the value of the portfolio of a whole.
2A similar point is made by Berlin, Saunders and Udell (1991) who point out that,
with perfect observability, even capital requirements are redundant and could be replaced
by a simple closure rule: “A credible net-worth closure rule for banks relegates depositor
discipline to a minor role. Indeed, a totally credible and error- and forbearance free closure
rule removes any need for depositors to monitor bank risk at all since they would never
lose on closure”.
2in its composition. In this event, and if they are able to change their portfolio
composition over time, i.e., engage in risk management3, banks may deliber-
ately deviate from compliance with capital adequacy rules, in other words,
they may “cheat”. Under these circumstances instruments such as Pillar 2
and Pillar 3 may not be redundant. Our paper focuses on the interaction
between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 when banks are able to use risk management
to “cheat” in relation to capital requirements.
We construct a model of bank behavior in which banks manage their
portfolios in the interests of their shareholders subject to the constraints
imposed by regulation. These regulatory constraints include not only cap-
ital requirements but actions on closure and recapitalization taken by the
regulator under the new Pillar 2.
Our model has three main innovations. First, the model includes both
costly recapitalization and dynamic portfolio management. The latter means
that banks are concerned about survival as well as exploiting deposit insur-
ance. Second, we consider explicitly a regime in which banks’ compliance
with capital requirements is imperfect, i.e., a world where banks can cheat.
In our analysis we consider two cases. In the ﬁrst, the implementation of
capital requirements is relatively eﬀective and banks are constrained to be
quite close to compliance at all points in time. In the second, the imple-
mentation of capital requirements is less eﬀective, allowing banks to deviate
substantially from the ideal of compliance at all points in time. Thus, in
the ﬁrst of these cases there is “extensive cheating” and, in the second, only
“limited cheating”. Third, we model Pillar 2 as a threshold level such that,
if a bank’s capital falls below this level at the time of an audit, it must either
recapitalize or face closure. This view of Pillar 2 is similar to the concept of
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) promulgated by the FDIC. This additional
constraint on the bank’s capital position gives the regulator an extra degree
of freedom. In this sense it is therefore a simple constraint on leverage. We
also consider the case where a bank that recapitalizes at the Pillar 2 thresh-
old level incurs a ﬁxed cost. This cost may be thought of as an increase in
compliance costs brought about by more intensive scrutiny on the part of the
regulator, the frictional cost of recapitalization or, simply, as a “ﬁne”.
Our analysis addresses the trade-oﬀ between the costs and beneﬁts of the
regulatory framework. Thus we need to consider not only measures of the
negative externalities associated with bank failure but also some measure
of the cost of regulation imposed by constraining bank activity. Thus we
include the probability of bank closure and the value of deposit insurance
3We use the term risk management to include any action that (deliberately) changes
the risk of the bank’s position over time.
3liabilities (PVDIL) as measures of the negative externalities of bank risk
taking and the average investment in risky assets and the capital utilization
as, respectively, measures of bank activity, to reﬂect the negative externality
of reduced activity induced by regulation, and the private costs associated
with high capital levels.
Our paper focuses on two main questions:
(i) What is the eﬀect of risk-based capital regulation (RBCR) on the
trade-oﬀ between the costs and beneﬁts of banking activity (1) when the
bank manages its portfolio dynamically; (2) when, at the time of an audit,
the bank’s capital is below a certain threshold level, the bank must either
recapitalize or it will be closed and (3) when banks’ compliance with RBCR
is imperfect?
(ii) How does the answer to the ﬁrst question change when the regulator
imposes a Pillar 2/PCA leverage constraint in addition to RBCR?
In our results we distinguish between a regime where there is only limited
cheating and where there is extensive cheating. In the ﬁrst case, RBCR are
still eﬀective in that they reduce the cost of failure as measured by the proba-
bility of closure and the PVDIL. Importantly, when there is limited cheating,
we ﬁnd that the level of investment in risky assets is relatively unaﬀected by
the level of RBCR. On the other hand when there is extensive cheating, we
ﬁnd that increasing capital requirements reduces banks’ investment in risky
assets and increases the probability of failure.
In relation to question (ii) above, we ask whether an intervention rule in
the spirit of Pillar 2/PCA and based simply on leverage rather than portfolio
risk, is eﬀective in conjunction with RBCR. We show that Pillar 2/PCA is
indeed eﬀective in reducing PVDIL: substantially when there is extensive
cheating and more modestly when there is limited cheating. When there is
only limited cheating, Pillar 2/PCA increases the probability of bank closure
and decreases the amount invested in risky assets. In the latter case, and
especially taking into account the costs of more frequent recapitalization, it
is possible that the net beneﬁts of Pillar 2/PCA may be negative.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the New
Basel Accord and its main advantages and drawbacks. Section 4 describes
the model and characterizes the bank’s optimal investment decisions. Section
5 introduces costs of recapitalization and examines their eﬀect on dynamic
portfolio management. Section 6 extends the analysis introducing risk-based
capital requirements (Pillar 1). Section 7 presents the results of the interac-
tion between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. Section 8 concludes.
42 The New Basel Accord: a brief description
In the early 1980’s, as concern about the ﬁnancial health of international
banks mounted and complaints of unfair competition increased, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the revision of
capital standards. An agreement was reached in July 1988, under which new
rules would be phased in by January 1993. The Basel accord of 1988 explicitly
considered only credit risk and the scheme was based entirely on capital
requirements. These requirements, still in force, comprise four elements: (i)
the deﬁnition of regulatory capital, (ii) the deﬁnition of the assets subject to
risk weighting, (iii) the risk weighting system, and (iv) the minimum ratio of
8%4.
When the Accord was introduced in 1988, its design was criticized as
being too crude and for its “one-size-ﬁts-all” approach5. Given these short-
comings, together with the experience accumulated since the Accord was
introduced, the Basel Committee is considering revising the current accord
(Basel Committee (1999, 2001, 2003)).
The proposed new accord diﬀers from the old one in two major respects.
First it allows the use of internal models by banks to assess the riskiness of
their portfolios and to determine their required capital cushion. This applies
to credit risk as well as to operational risk and delegates to a signiﬁcant
extent the determination of regulatory capital adequacy requirements. This
regime is available to banks if they choose this option and if their internal
4Following its introduction, the Accord has been ﬁne-tuned to accommodate ﬁnancial
innovation and some of the risks not initially considered. For example, it was amended
in 1995 and 1996 to require banks to set aside capital in order to cover the risk of losses
arising from movements in market prices. In 1995 the required capital charge was based
on the “standard approach” similar to that applied to credit risk. The standard approach
deﬁnes the risk charges associated with each position and speciﬁes how any risk position
has to be aggregated into the overall market risk capital charge. The amendment of 1996
allows banks to use, as an alternative to the standard approach, their internal models to
determine the required capital charge for market risk. The internal model approach allows
a bank to use its model to estimate the Value-at-Risk (VaR) in its trading account, that
is, the maximum loss that the portfolio is likely to experience over a given holding period
with a certain probability. The market risk capital requirement is then set based on the
VaR estimate. The main novelty of this approach is that it accounts for risk reduction in
the portfolio resulting from hedging and diversiﬁcation.
5The main criticisms were, among other things, (i) the capital ratio appeared to lack
economic foundation, (ii) the risk weights did not reﬂect accurately the risk of the obligor
and (iii) it did not account for the beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation. One of the main prob-
lems with the existing Accord is the ability of banks to arbitrage their regulatory capital
requirements (see Jones (2000)) and exploit divergences between true economic risk and
risk measured under the Accord.
5model is validated by the regulatory authority. Second, by adding two ad-
ditional “pillars”, alongside the traditional focus on minimum bank capital,
the new accord acknowledges the importance of complementary mechanisms
to safeguard against bank failure. Thus, the new capital adequacy scheme
is based on three pillars: (i) capital adequacy requirements (Pillar 1), (ii)
supervisory review (Pillar 2) and (iii) market discipline (Pillar 3).
With regard to the ﬁrst pillar, the Committee proposes two approaches.
The ﬁrst, so called “standardized” approach, adopts external ratings, such
as those provided by rating agencies, export credit agencies, and other qual-
iﬁed institutions. The second approach, called the “Internal rating-based
approach”, allows the use of internal rating systems developed by banks,
subject to their meeting speciﬁc criteria yet to be deﬁned and validation by
the relevant national supervisory authority. The internal ratings approach
is also divided in two broad approaches: the “advanced” and the “founda-
tion”. The former gives some discretion to banks in choosing the parameters
that determine risk weights, and consequently, in determining their capital
requirements. The foundation approach, in contrast, provides little discre-
tion6.
As far as the second Pillar is concerned, the proposals of the Basel Com-
mittee underline the importance of supervisory activity, such as reports and
inspections. These are carried out by individual national authorities who
are authorized to impose, through “moral suasion”, higher capital require-
ments than the minimum under the capital adequacy rules. In particular,
Pillar 2 emphasizes the importance of the supervisory review process as an
essential element of the new Accord (see Santos (2001)). Pillar 2 encour-
ages banks to develop internal economic capital assessments, appropriate to
their own risk proﬁles, for identifying, measuring, and controlling risks. The
emphasis on internal assessments of capital adequacy recognizes that any
rules-based approach will inevitably lag behind the changing risk proﬁles of
complex banking organizations. Banks’ internal assessments should give ex-
plicit recognition to the quality of the risk management and control processes
and to risks not fully addressed in Pillar 1. Importantly, Pillar 2 provides the
basis for supervisory intervention and allows regulators to consider a range
of options if they become concerned that banks are not meeting the require-
ments. These actions may include more intense monitoring of the bank;
restricting the payment of dividends; requiring the bank to prepare and im-
plement a satisfactory capital adequacy restoration plan; and requiring the
6In addition to revising the criteria for the determination of the minimum capital
associated to the credit risk of individual exposures, the reform proposals advanced by
the Committee introduce a capital requirement for operational risks, which is in turn
determined using three diﬀerent approaches presenting a growing degree of sophistication.
6bank to raise additional capital immediately. Supervisors should have the
discretion to use the tools best suited to the circumstances of the bank and
its operating environment (New Accord: Principle 4: 717).
Finally, the third Pillar is intended to encourage banks to disclose infor-
mation in order to enhance the role of the market in monitoring banks. To
that end, the Committee is proposing that banks disclose information on,
among other things, the composition of their regulatory capital, risk expo-
sures and risk-based capital ratios computed in accordance with the Accord’s
methodology.
In the light of these objectives, the Basel Committee has articulated four
principles: (1) Each bank should assess its internal capital adequacy in light
of its risk proﬁle, (2) Supervisors should review internal assessments, (3)
Banks should hold capital above regulatory minimums, and (4) Supervisors
should intervene at an early stage.
The descriptions of the second and third Pillars by the Basel Committee
are not as extensive or detailed as that of the ﬁrst. Nevertheless, it is signif-
icant that for the ﬁrst time in international capital regulation, supervision
and market discipline are placed at the same point of the hierarchy as the
regulatory minimum. In discussing the second Pillar the proposal states that:
“The supervisory review process should not be viewed as a discretionary pil-
lar but, rather, as a critical complement to both the minimum regulatory
capital requirement and market discipline.”
In this paper we analyze the eﬀects of Pillar 2 intervention and in partic-
ular, the interaction between Pillar 2 and Pillar 1. We characterize Pillar 2
as a threshold level of leverage such that a bank with higher leverage than
this threshold at the time of an audit is required either to recapitalize or
to close. If a bank recapitalizes it incurs a cost. This characterization is
therefore ﬁrmly in the spirit of both PCA and Basel II.
We show ﬁrst that Pillar 2 intervention has a signiﬁcant impact on the
frequency of bank closure and the value of deposit insurance liabilities only
when regulators are unable to force banks to comply with Pillar 1 risk based
capital requirements at all times. This may arise, for example, as the result
of monitoring costs. If banks always comply with risk based capital require-
ments then both failure rates and the present value of deposit insurance
liability go to zero7.
However, if banks do not always comply with Pillar 1 capital require-
ments, Pillar 2 may have a role by inducing banks to manage their portfolios
so as to reduce the likelihood of incurring recapitalization costs. A central
issue that we explore in the paper is the interaction between the level of risk
7Unless there are jumps in the value of the portfolio of bank assets.
7based capital requirements (Pillar 1), the threshold leverage level (Pillar 2)
and the degree of non-compliance with Pillar 1 rules. More particularly, we
investigate whether, as the regulators hope, Pillar 2 does indeed act as com-
plement to Pillar 1 – in the sense that it increases the eﬀectiveness of Pillar
1 – or whether it is simply a substitute, a second line of defence’.
3 Advantages and main drawbacks of the New
Accord
The Basel Committee’s proposals can be seen as an attempt to address some
of the drawbacks of the previous capital adequacy scheme. In particular,
the New Accord represents an advance in three main areas. First, with the
objective of making capital requirements more risk sensitive, it introduces a
more accurate framework for the assessment of risk, in particular credit risk.
Although the new proposals have undoubtedly raised the level of the analysis
of credit risk from the ﬁrst Accord, there remain some important questions
about some aspects, e.g., how the correlation of credit exposures is treated.
Moreover, for the ﬁrst time the rules explicitly include operational risk as
one of the determinants of required capital (Pillar 1). The new rules will also
enhance the role of banks’ internal assessments of risk as the basis for capital
requirements. Second, the new accord represents an attempt on the part of
regulators to lower the impact of capital regulation as a source of competitive
inequality by reducing the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. Third, the
new accord enhances the role for regulatory review and intervention (Pillar
2) and market discipline (Pillar 3).
In introducing an extension to the current Accord, that concentrates only
on capital requirements, Basel II is more consistent with the consensus of the
literature on asymmetries of information that, in general, it is advantageous
to consider a menu-based approach rather than a uniform “one-size-ﬁts-all”
rule8. The limitations of a simple capital adequacy approach in our paper
arise when bank portfolios are imperfectly observable by the auditor and
banks are able to engage in dynamic portfolio management.
8See Kane (1990) and Goodhart et al. (1998) for a discussion of the principal-agent
problems that can arise between regulators and regulated and Hauswald and Senbet (1999)
for the design of optimal banking regulation in the presence of incentive conﬂicts between
regulators and society. For other analysis of the interplay between capital regulation and
monitoring of the bank by a regulator, see Campbell, Chan and Marino (1992) and Milne
and Whalley (2001).
8Nonetheless, it appears that the new Accord does have some signiﬁcant
weaknesses and, among these, we draw particular attention to the following.
A major problem – long present in the literature – in assessing develop-
ments in banking regulation, and ﬁnancial regulation in general, is that there
is little discussion, and certainly no consensus, on the objectives that the reg-
ulator should pursue (Dewatripont and Tirole (1993)). The two most com-
monly cited justiﬁcations for bank regulation, and capital regulation in par-
ticular, are (i) the mitigation of systemic risks (see Goodhart et. al. (1998),
and Benston and Kaufman (1996) among others) and (ii) the need to control
the value of deposit insurances liabilities (see Merton (1997), Genotte and
Pyle (1991), Buser, Chen and Kane (1981), Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor
(1992), Diamond and Dybvig. (1986) among others). Indeed the authors of
the Basel II proposals refer to their “ .. fundamental objective ... to develop
a framework that would further enhance the soundness and stability of the
international banking system ..”.
Thus it might seem curious to an outsider that the new Basel II accord
is so little concerned with the problem of systemic risk that has for so long
been seen as central to the design of bank regulation. Nonetheless we ﬁnd this
‘non-systemic’ same view expressed repeatedly by the regulators in describing
the goals of the new accord. For example the quotation below, which comes
from the BIS itself, addresses what we would regard as some of the central
questions in bank regulation and does so without any reference to systemic
costs:
“Why are banks subject to capital requirements?
Nearly all jurisdictions with active banking markets require bank-
ing organizations to maintain at least a minimum level of capital.
Capital serves as a foundation for a bank’s future growth and as a
cushion against its unexpected losses. Adequately capitalized banks
that are well managed are better able to withstand losses and to pro-
vide credit to consumers and businesses alike throughout the business
cycle, including during downturns. Adequate levels of capital thereby
help to promote public conﬁdence in the banking system.
Why is a new capital standard necessary today?
Advances in risk management practices, technology, and banking
markets have made the 1988 Accord’s simple approach to measuring
capital less meaningful for many banking organizations.
What is the goal for the Basel II Framework and how will it
be accomplished?
9The overarching goal for the Basel II Framework is to promote the
adequate capitalization of banks and to encourage improvements in
risk management, thereby strengthening the stability of the ﬁnancial
system. This goal will be accomplished through the introduction of
“three pillars” that reinforce each other and that create incentives for
banks to enhance the quality of their control processes”. (BIS, 2004)
The connection between the objective of enhancing the “soundness and
stability” of the banking system and the speciﬁcs of the proposal, particularly
in relation to systemic risk, are unclear. More broadly, the Basel II Accord
is almost silent on the presence of externalities such as systemic failure and
contagion which would be regarded by many as the principal justiﬁcation for
regulatory intervention (Berlin, Saunders and Uddell (1991), Allen and Gale
(2003)). Without externalities, decisions, e.g., on capital structure, that are
optimal from the private perspective of bank owners would also be socially
optimal and, in this case, there would be no need for regulation.
The “externality-free” view of regulation that Basel II appears to espouse
is also reﬂected in Pillar 3. This seeks to “encourage market discipline by
developing a set of disclosure requirements that allow market participants
to assess key information about a bank’s risk proﬁle and level of capitaliza-
tion” (Basel Committee (2004)). However, it is unclear what impact greater
transparency would have. If capital requirements are set without reference to
the social costs of failure, i.e., regulatory capital requirements coincide with
privately optimal levels of capital, then banks are, in any case, incentivized
to maintain these levels and greater transparency would have little eﬀect. If
capital requirements do reﬂect the social costs of failure, i.e., are higher than
those banks would choose privately, then it is not clear how disclosing to a
private counterparty, a deﬁcit against regulatory capital requirements would
give the bank any incentive to increase capital.
When systemic costs are taken into account, optimal regulatory design
involves trading oﬀ the social beneﬁts of, for example, a lower frequency of
failure with the private costs of achieving this. But when systemic issues
are excluded from the analysis, there is no trade-oﬀ because the interests
of private owners and social welfare coincide. In this case the prescriptions
of the regulator are those that the bank would optimally choose for itself
and the regulator becomes a sort of “super consultant” helping to promote
“good practice” and “sound analysis”. These are worthy objectives but it
is unclear why they need to be promoted within a legal framework such as
Basel II. For example, the Basel Committee states that it “believes that the
revised framework will promote the adoption of stronger risk management
10practices by the banking industry”. While undoubtedly desirable, it is not
clear how improving management practice in the area of risk management
addresses the broad objectives of “soundness and stability” or, indeed, that
banks themselves are not in a better position to decide on the appropriate
level of investment in risk management.
The absence in the Basel Accord of any substantial discussion of costs is
a major omission.9 For example, if the costs imposed by capital requirements
were small while the social costs of failure were signiﬁcant, required capital
should be set to suﬃciently high levels that the incidence of bank failure
would be minimal. The fact that no bank regulator proposes such a regime
suggests that regulators at least consider that the costs imposed by capital
regulation are signiﬁcant. Certainly the US House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Financial Services (USHRCFS) has reservations about the costs
imposed by capital requirements: “We are concerned that the bank capital
charges created by Basel II, if implemented, could be overly onerous and
may discourage banks from engaging in activities which promote economic
developments”10.
In our analysis we reﬂect the trade-oﬀ between, on one hand, the public
and private costs of failure and, on the other, the costs imposed by regulation.
Ideally, alternative designs for Basel II would ﬁnd the best trade-oﬀ between
these costs using a general equilibrium approach11. In the absence of such
a model we focus on four outcome variables that are plausible candidates
for the arguments of the welfare function that might be derived from an
equilibrium model.
The ﬁrst is the PVDIL: the cost of insuring deposits. The second is the
frequency of bank closure which we regard as an index of the systemic cost of
failure. All else equal, a low frequency of failure would promote conﬁdence in
9References to the cost of capital requirements by the Basel Committee are rare. Among
the small number of examples, the following quotation makes an implicit reference to cost
when it refers to the possibility that capital level might be “too high”:
“The technical challenge for both banks and supervisors has been to determine how
much capital is necessary to serve as a suﬃcient buﬀer against unexpected losses. If
capital levels are too low, banks may be unable to absorb high levels of losses. Excessively
low levels of capital increase the risk of bank failures which, in turn, may put depositors’
funds at risk. If capital levels are too high, banks may not be able to make the most
eﬃcient use of their resources, which may constrain their ability to make credit available”.
(BIS, 2004)
10US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services letter to the chairmen
of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Director
of the Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision, 3 November 2003.
11See, for example, Suarez and Repullo (2004). However, deﬁning an appropriate social
welfare function is always problematical.
11the banking system and enhance the eﬃciency of the payments mechanism
(see Diamond and Dybvig (1986))
Third, there is a widely held – if imperfectly articulated – view, reﬂected
in the concerns expressed by the USHRCFS, that high levels of capital impose
a cost on banks. In our analysis we use the average level of bank capital as
a measure of this cost.
Finally, we wish to capture the positive externalities that may arise from
banking activity, e.g., bank lending. Clearly, a capital requirements regime
that was so onerous as to substantially eliminate banking activity would
also reduce both the frequency of failure and the PVDIL to zero. A former
chairman of the London Stock Exchange once referred to this approach as
the “regulation of the graveyard”. The quotation above from the USHRCFS
suggests that they share these concerns and so we also report the average level
of risky assets held as a proxy for banks’ contribution to economic activity
through lending.
The Basel Committee has attempted to assess the potential impact of the
new Accord on capital requirements for diﬀerent types of banks in a variety
of countries by carrying out “Quantitative Impact Studies” (QIS). These
entail each bank recalculating capital requirements for its current portfolio
under the new Accord. However, the QIS calculations were conducted under
ceteris paribus assumptions and did not attempt to take into account any
behavioral response on the part of banks to the new Accord. One of the aims
of this paper is to provide a framework within which the behavioral response
of banks to changes in regulation might be studied.
Pillars 2 and 3 are major innovations in the new Accord and represent
an explicit recognition that capital supervision involves more than capital
requirements. Pillar 2, in particular, adds an important instrument to the
bank regulator’s armory and allows for some discretion over important ele-
ments such as closure, dividend payments and recapitalization. Pillar 3, by
encouraging transparency, attempts to capture the beneﬁts of market disci-
pline. However, two important issues remain. First, as other authors (see
Saidenberg and Schuermann (2003), von Thadden (2003)) have pointed out,
there is a substantial imbalance in the detail provided by the Committee
between Pillar 1, on one hand, and Pillars 2 and 3 on the other. The focus of
the Committee’s attention seems clear. Second, and more important, there is
no discussion of the interaction between capital rules, and market discipline
and the rules governing closure, dividend payments and recapitalization.
The main aim of this paper is to try to provide a framework within which
to analyze the relations between capital requirements and closure, dividend
payments and recapitalization. Descamps, Rochet and Roger (2003) have
also drawn attention to the importance of this issue.
12Finally, one aspect of the objectives of Basel II is to ensure that “...
capital adequacy regulation will not be a signiﬁcant source of competitive
inequality among internationally active banks”. However trying to make
regulation neutral with respect to competition (“the level playing ﬁeld”)
is a more demanding objective. First, regulation almost inevitably aﬀects
competition because it aﬀects bank costs. Second, if the regulator attempts
to design capital requirements, say, by ﬁnding the optimal trade-oﬀ between
private and social costs, then capital rules will almost inevitably vary across
banks unless they are all identical in term of their social costs (e.g., of failure).
Diﬀerentiation of this kind – e.g., between large banks and small banks – is
not found in the Basel II rules or, indeed, in other capital adequacy regimes.
It appears that the pressure on regulators for “equal treatment” among banks
dominates a more ﬁne-tuned approach to regulatory design.
4 The model
4.1 Timing and assumptions
In our model a bank is an institution that holds ﬁnancial assets and is ﬁ-
nanced by equity and deposits.
Bank shareholders and depositors: Shareholders are risk neutral,
enjoy limited liability and are initially granted a banking charter. The charter
permits the bank to continue in business indeﬁnitely under the control of its
shareholders unless, at the time of an audit, the regulator ﬁnds the bank is in
violation of regulation such as capital requirements. In this case the charter
is not renewed, the shareholders lose control of the bank and the value of
their equity is zero.
If the bank is solvent at time t − 1, it raises deposits12 Dt−1 and capital
kDt−1, k > 0 so that total assets invested are:
At−1 = (1 + k)Dt−1. (1)
The deposits are one-period term deposits paying a total rate of return
of rd. Thus, at maturity the amount due to depositors is:
Dt = Dt−1(1 + r
d). (2)
At this point, if the bank is “solvent”, the accrued interest, rdDt−1, is
paid to depositors and deposits are rolled over at the same interest rate.
12We take the volume of a bank’s deposits as exogenous.
13Regulators and audit frequency: We assume that audits take place
at ﬁxed times t = 1,2,.... The government guarantees the deposits and
charges the bank a ﬁxed premium per dollar of insured deposits that is the
same for all banks13. This premium is included in the deposit rate rd14.
Portfolio revisions and investment choice: Between successive audit
dates there are n equally spaced times at which the portfolio may be revised.
Setting ∆t ≡ 1/n, the portfolio revision dates, between audit dates t and
t + 1, are therefore:
t,t + ∆t,t + 2∆t,.....,t + (n − 1)∆t,t + 1. (3)
For simplicity we assume that the bank may choose between two assets: a
risk free bond with maturity 1/n, yielding a constant net return   r per period
of length 1/n (r per period of length 1) and a risky asset yielding a gross
random return Rt+j∆t over the period (t+(j−1)∆t) to (t+j∆t)15. Returns on
the risky asset are independently distributed over time and have a constant
expected gross return of E [Rt+j∆t] ≡ (1 +   a), where   a is the net expected
return per period of length 1/n (a per period of length 1). Notice that we
assume that, at each portfolio revision date, the bank is allowed either to
increase or decrease its investment in the risky asset, i.e. the risky asset is
marketable.
In our model we assume that the only source of bank rent is deposit
insurance, i.e. rd = r = a. This may appear to be a very pessimistic view
of banking as in this case a bank’s only objective is to try to exploit deposit
insurance. However, we know that when banks have other sources of rents
this acts as a natural curb on excessive risk taking and capital requirements
will be less necessary. In our framework the banks that are most likely to
default are those without other signiﬁcant sources of rents who will try to
hold as little capital as possible.
In making these assumptions we have in mind a competitive market where
the surplus associated with the projects ﬁnanced by loans is captured entirely
by the borrowers. The presence of a borrower surplus means, as we have
mentioned above, that lending is, on average, welfare improving. For this
reason, again as mentioned earlier, we use the volume of risky assets held by
the bank as one argument of a measure of welfare.
13This means that the deposit insurance premium is not risk dependent and is therefore
not actuarially fair.
14Equivalently, we may interpret this arrangement as one where the depositors pay the
deposit insurance premium and receive a net interest rate of rd.
15This means that we do not address the issues related to portfolio diversiﬁcation as in
Boot and Thakor (1991).
14Portfolio choice: Let wt+j∆t denote the percentage of the portfolio
held in the risky asset at time t + j∆t with the remainder invested in the
“safe” security. We limit the leverage that the bank can take on by imposing
a no-short selling constraint (0 ≤ wt+j∆t ≤ 1) on both the risky and safe
assets16:
0 ≤ wt+j∆t ≤ 1 ∀ t ∈ [0,∞],∀ j ∈ [0,n − 1]. (4)
The bank’s portfolio management strategy is represented as a sequence





for all 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞ (5)
and 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, where θt represents the strategy between audit dates
t and t + 1 and Θ the collection of these sub-strategies for audit dates
1,2,...,t,...∞.
Intertemporal budget constraint: The intertemporal budget con-
straint is given by:
At+(j+1)∆t = [wt+j∆tRt+j∆t + (1 − wt+j∆t)(1 +   r)]At+j∆t, (6)




[wt+j∆tRt+j∆t + (1 − wt+j∆t)(1 +   r)]At (7)
Bank closure rule (transfer of control from shareholders to su-
pervisor): Most of the previous literature has assumed a closure rule under
which banking authorities deny the renewal of the banking licence and close
the bank if its net worth (asset value minus deposits) is negative at the
end of a period, that is if the asset value is lower than the threshold point
represented by the deposit value (Marcus (1984), Keeley (1990), Hellman,
Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000), Pelizzon and Schaefer (2004)). This closure
rule induces the bank to be “prudent” when the bank has a suﬃciently high
16It may not be immediately apparent that a non negativity constraint on the risky
asset would ever been binding. However, under the assumptions that we introduce below
(limited liability) we show that the bank will be risk preferring in some regions and would
short the risky asset if they could.
15rent from deposit insurance, interest ceilings or monopoly power in the de-
posit or asset market. Such a closure policy serves as a mechanism that both
manages bank distress ex-post and may also have a disciplinary eﬀect on
ex-ante actions. A major drawback of this approach, however, is that share-
holders who wish to provide capital to re-establish solvency are prevented
from doing so. Among the problems raised by this assumption is the ques-
tion of whether, by refusing to allow recapitalization, the government would
be “illegally” expropriating the property of bank shareholders.
Thus, in this paper we consider the case where the banking authorities,
instead of closing the bank or intervening and assuming control (for equi-
tyholders this is the same as closing the bank), allow recapitalization by
shareholders17 and renewal of the licence if, after recapitalization, the vol-
ume of capital meets a given minimum threshold level, k18. In the papers
cited in the previous paragraph k is a small quantity of capital that guar-
antees solvency. Later in the paper, where we introduce Pillar 2/PCA, this
threshold will be higher.
Under this rule equityholders have an option to retain the banking licence.
They will exercise this option when there is an amount of capital, k∗ > k, such
that the volume of capital the bank shareholders need to raise, k∗D+Dt−At
is lower than the value of equity, S , after recapitalization.
More formally, let the indicator variable It represent whether the bank is
open (It = 1) or closed (It = 0) at time t:
It =

      












Is = 1 and S > k∗D + Dt − At
(8)
with I0 = 1.
17Other authors consider this option. See Suarez (1994), Fries, Barral and Perraudin
(1997) and Pages and Santos (2003) among others .
18A typical situation is where bank losses are covered by bank mergers and acquisitions.
In our framework, it is the same if capital is replenished by old or new shareholders, the
key point is that old shareholders do not lose 100% of the franchise value. Dewatripont
and Tirole (1993) state that this closure policy is very common in US (73,8%).
Another rescue policy documented by Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) is the “open bank
assistance” policy also called “bail out”. In a bail out the bank liquidates the defaulted as-
sets, the government covers the shortfall to the depositors whose claims are in default, and
the bank is not closed. This rescue policy is assimilable to our closure rule if shareholders
still maintain a proportional claim on the bank franchise value. It is also assimilable to
the government takeover when the bank is completely nationalized.
16Dividend policy and capital replenishment: With this new feature,




At − Dt − k∗D if S ≥ Dt + k∗D − At
0 otherwise (9)
4.2 The problem
The bank chooses its investment policy θ
∗
t, (i.e. the percentage w∗
t+j∆t in-
vested in the risky asset at each time t + j∆t ) and the level of capital after






−tE [dt (θt,kt)] (10)




imizes the value to shareholders, subject to (4), kt > k and where dividends,
dt, are deﬁned in (9).
This problem is time invariant for any audit time because, if the bank
is solvent at audit time t, then, since the distribution of future dividends at
t + 1 is identical for all t, the portfolio problem faced by the bank is also
identical at each audit time when the bank is solvent. This means that the
value of equity at time t, conditional on solvency, is given by19:
St =
   ∞
t+1(1 + r)−(s−t)E [ds] = (1 + r){E [dt+1] + St+1} if It+1 = 1
0 if It+1 = 0
,
(11)
This quantity is constant at each audit time when the bank is solvent and
can be written as20:
19Note that dt+1 and St+1are functions of the portfolio strategy, θt, and the level of
capital, kt, but, for sake of notational clarity, we suppress this dependence.










∗,k∗) is the probability of default at the next audit. Thus, the value
of equity is equal to the expected dividend divided by the sum of risk free
rate and the probability of default. In other words, the value of equity has a
character of a perpetuity where the discount rate is adjusted for default21.
The bank’s portfolio and capital problem may also be deﬁned as the
maximization of the franchise value, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the





4.3 Welfare Function Variables
To evaluate the performance of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 we need some measures
of the welfare outcomes to which these rules give rise. In the absence of a
formal welfare function, and as described earlier, we employ the following four
measures: the probability of bank closure and the value of deposit insurance
liabilities (PVDIL) as measures of the negative externalities of bank risk
taking and the average investment in risky assets and the capital utilization
as, respectively, measures of bank activity, to reﬂect the positive externalities
of bank lending, and the private costs associated with high capital levels.
The ﬁrst measure, the probability of bank closure, π, has already been
described above. Using (9), (11) and (12) it is straightforward to show that




= PV DIL, (14)
where “Put” represents the payoﬀ on a one-period option held by the bank




(Dt − At)f(At)dAt ≡ E (Put) (15)
21A similar relation obtained in a number of models of defaultable bonds (see Lando
(1997) and Duﬃe and Singleton (1999))













where the expectation of the term in square brackets is taken over paths
for the asset value, At+j∆t, and portfolio proportion, w∗
t+j∆t, and where ω
denotes the path.
Finally, the capital utilization is the optimal amount of capital that share-
holders decide to provide at time zero and at each audit date, i.e., k∗.
4.4 Bank’s optimal policy
In this section we show that the disciplinary eﬀect of the franchise value van-
ishes when closure rules allow costless recapitalization. The feedback eﬀect of
alternative closure policies on the incentives of bank owners to avoid ﬁnancial
distress warrants closer attention, a point emphasized by the wide range of
such policies that regulators actually employ.22. This result is summarized
in the following lemma.
LEMMA 1: When recapitalization is allowed (and F < D), the optimal




This result (already proved by Suarez (1994) for the case with deposit
rents only and Pelizzon (2001) for diﬀerent sources of rents) is driven by
the form of the payoﬀs associated with one-period decisions. Under the
simple rule described above where closure takes place when the asset value is
lower than the threshold point represented by the deposit value, the payoﬀ
22See Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) for a comparison of rescue policies employed in
the developed economies of the United States, Japan, and European Nordic countries.
Legislation in general calls for increasingly strict sanctions against banks as their capital
levels deteriorate (see for example the Prompt Corrective Action) but still permits some
regulators discretion concerning the closure of banks. See also Gupta and Misra (1999)
for a review of failure and failure resolution in the US thrift and banking industries.
19to shareholders at the time of an audit, when the bank continues, is given
by the sum of the dividend cash ﬂow, d (which is negative in the case of
recapitalization) and the value of the equity in continuation, S. If, at the
time of an audit, the bank is closed when At < Dt the payoﬀ to equityholders
is zero. This is illustrated in Figure (1).
[Insert FIGURE (1) about here]
In contrast, when recapitalization is allowed even when the value of assets
is below that of liabilities, shareholders’ total payoﬀ is given by the sum of
value of equity S and the dividend cash ﬂow d when the value of equity
after recapitalization is higher than the amount of capital contributed (S >
At−Dt+k∗D), and zero otherwise. Figure (2) shows the total payoﬀ in this
case.
[Insert FIGURE (2) about here]
Figures (1) with (2) diﬀer for asset values between Dt + k∗D − S and
Dt. The non-convexity of the total payoﬀ as a function of the asset value
in the ﬁrst case explains shareholders’ aversion to risk when F is suﬃciently
high. Conversely, the convexity of the total payoﬀ in the second case induces
risk-loving.
As Lemma 1 states, in the case of a convex payoﬀ function, the optimal
portfolio strategy for bank is always to invest entirely in the risky asset. The
option to recapitalize in this case not only induces the bank to choose the
most risky strategy but also aﬀects the probability of default and the value
of deposit insurance liabilities (Pelizzon (2001)).
5 Costs of Recapitalization
Thus, the case of a convex payoﬀ function analyzed by Suarez (1994) al-
lows recapitalization but leads to the prediction that banks always seek to
maximize risk. As a characterization of actual bank behavior this approach
probably has limited descriptive power. As mentioned above, the approach
taken in the earlier literature induced prudence on the part of banks but only
by expropriating the positive franchise value that insolvent banks (A < D)
would have had if allowed to recapitalize.
In this paper we follow Suarez (1994) in allowing recapitalization for all






At − Dt − k∗D if At ≥ Dt + k∗D
(At − Dt − k∗D)(1 + v) if S ≥ Dt + k∗D − At and At < Dt + k∗D
0 otherwise
(17)
The presence of these costs reintroduces concavity into the bank’s pay-
oﬀ function and, depending on the parameters, this is suﬃcient to induce
prudence on the part of the bank. Figure (3) shows the payoﬀ to sharehold-
ers as a function of the asset value where the bank incurs a variable cost of
replenishing the bank’s capital23 to a level k∗.
[Insert FIGURE (3) about here]
There is a second cost that banks incur when they recapitalize. This is
a ﬁxed cost, C, that is related to the Pillar 2/PCA intervention threshold   k





At − Dt − k∗D if At ≥ Dt + k∗D
(At − Dt − k∗D)(1 + v) − C if S ≥ Dt + k∗D − At and At < Dt + k∗D
0 otherwise
(18)
Our interpretation of this cost is as an increase in the direct and indirect
costs of compliance that comes about as a result of the regulator increasing
its intensity of monitoring. This may be viewed in terms of increased direct
compliance costs, diversion of management time, restrictions on new business
activities etc. This situation is illustrated in Figure (4) where, for simplicity,
we suppress the variable cost of recapitalization that was illustrated in Figure
(3).
[Insert FIGURE (4) about here]
Note that in our analysis the impact of the threshold   k on the sharehold-
ers’ payoﬀ comes entirely from the cost imposed on the bank rather than the
speciﬁcs of the action taken by the regulator (inspections, detailed auditing
etc.).
23Our model does not explain why equity is relatively expensive. This can be because
of tax rules, agency costs of equity, and in the case of banks a comparative advantage in
the collection of deposit funds (Taggart and Greenbaum (1978)). For other motivations
of expensive bank costs of capital see Boot (2001) and Berger et al. (1995).
21The shape of this objective function is almost identical to the one pre-
sented in Pelizzon and Schaefer (2004) and provides the bank with an incen-
tive to manage its portfolio dynamically. The optimal strategy is character-
ized by a U-shaped relation between the amount invested in the risky asset
and the value of bank assets. This relation has a strong discontinuity. When
the bank is solvent it follows a portfolio insurance strategy which means that
the amount invested in the risky asset falls towards zero as the bank’s net
worth falls to zero. However, when the bank becomes insolvent by even a
small amount the amount invested in the risky asset jumps to the maximum
possible.
As shown in Pelizzon and Schaefer (2004), this strategy has a strong eﬀect
on the distribution of the bank’s asset value at an audit time. Moreover, as
shown in Pelizzon and Schaefer (2004), under risk management the one-to-
one relation between π and PVDIL is no longer guaranteed. Indeed, with
portfolio revision the asset risk is, in some states, lower than the maximum
and so the average risk is also lower. We might expect, therefore, that both π
and PVDIL would be lower in the latter case. In fact, while the probability
of default is indeed lower, the PVDIL is higher. This occurs because the
shape of the distribution in these two cases is diﬀerent. The rents earned
by the bank are generated by exploiting the deposit insurance and so, to
exploit this source of rents to the maximum, the bank uses risk management
to increase the expected loss in those cases where the bank does default while
simultaneously increasing the probability of survival and therefore the length
of time the shareholders expect to receive dividends before closure.
A consequence of our analysis is that the value of deposit insurance is
diﬀerent when banks have the ability to engage in risk management. Ignoring
this feature is likely to lead to an understatement of the cost of deposit
insurance and unreliable conclusions about the consequences of bank capital
regulation. These two points are central to the analysis performed in the
remainder of this paper.
6 Risk Based Capital Requirements (Pillar
1)
Under the 1988 Accord a bank’s required capital was a linear function of the
amount invested in risky assets. More recent rules rely on the VaR (Value-
at-Risk) framework. In our model there is only one risky asset and therefore,
under both the 1988 Accord and the Basel II (i.e., the VaR rule), required
capital depends only on, wj, the fraction of assets invested in the risky asset.
22We assume a risk-based capital rule in which the required level of capital





where kR is the required amount of capital expressed as a percentage of
deposits and λ is the required capital per unit of investment in the risky
asset. In the case with constant portfolio positions and normally distributed
asset values, for example, λ is the product of (i) the number of standard
deviations deﬁning the conﬁdence level, (ii) the volatility of the rate of return
on risky assets and (iii) a scaling factor.
Under this rule, which we apply in the paper, the bank’s investment in











where w represents the maximum permissible investment in the risky asset
for a given ratio of deposits to assets and to a percentage of capital kj deﬁned
as:
kj =
Aj − D(1 + r)1/n
D
. (21)
One of the main objectives of our paper is to analyze the eﬀects of capital
regulation on bank risk taking. However, our analysis to this point assumes
an environment that is entirely unregulated except for the periodic audits
when, if the percentage of capital is lower than k the bank must either recap-
italize or is closed. Between audits, however, we have assumed that the bank
has complete freedom to choose the risk of its portfolio even if insolvent.
In practice banks are required to observe capital requirements continu-
ously through time and face censure, or worse, if they are discovered, even
ex-post, to have violated the rules. However, if (i) asset prices are continu-
ous, (ii) capital rules are applied continuously through time and (iii) capital
rules force banks to eliminate risk from their portfolio when their capital falls
below a given (non negative) level, a bank’s probability of default becomes
zero24.
24As mentioned above, in this setting, the relevant assumption is the absence of jumps
in the value of the entire portfolio, a much less stringent constraint than the absence of
jumps for any single claim in the portfolio.
23With continuous portfolio revision the only way to avoid this unrealistic
conclusion is to assume – perhaps not unrealistically – that banks are able
to continue to operate, and to invest in risky assets, even when in violation
of either, or both, the leverage constraint (k) and the risk-based capital
requirements (RBCR). Without some assumption of this kind the analysis
of the eﬀect of capital requirements in a dynamic context is without content.
However, in order to say something about the eﬀects of capital requirements
in this case, we must also say something about the extent to which banks
are able to deviate from regulatory constraints on leverage and exposure to
risky assets. In other words, we have to make assumptions about the extent
to which banks are able to “cheat”.
We consider two diﬀerent levels of “cheating”:
1. Extensive Cheating (Ext-Cheat): Here, capital requirements are bind-
ing only when there is an audit; at all other times the bank faces no con-
straints on its portfolio. Moreover, irrespective of its portfolio composition
prior to audit, any solvent bank may reorganize its portfolio to meet capital
requirements but is then constrained to hold this portfolio up to the next
portfolio revision date. In all other periods the portfolio is unconstrained
and so the bank satisﬁes the RBCR audit simply by “window dressing” its
portfolio for the audit date. In this highly ineﬀective capital requirements
regime, a regulator is able to monitor and control the activities of banks only
at the time of an audit.





and 0 < wt+j∆t ≤ 1 (22)
2. Limited Cheating (Lim-Cheat): Between two audit dates, the maxi-
mum exposure of the bank to the risky asset is the greater of (i) the level
determined by its capital at the earlier audit date and (ii) the exposure based
on its actual capital at the time. Here, the capital requirements regime is
much more eﬀective than under the Ext-Cheat rule. Its main deﬁciency is
that banks are able to conceal any decrease in capital from the level observed
by the regulator at the previous audit date and are therefore able to invest
in the risky asset up to an amount determined either by this amount or their











) ≡ wm (23)
24Two points are worth noting here. First, these rules are diﬀerent only
when banks are able to engage in risk management since, otherwise, banks
choose their portfolios only on the audit date when, under both regimes,
they comply with capital requirements. Second, since in our model a bank
is always able to liquidate its holding of risky assets and invest the proceeds
in the riskless asset (at which point the risk-based required capital is zero),
a bank will never be closed as a result of a violation of RBCR.
6.1 Eﬀect of RBCR on Welfare Function Variables
We now ask how changes in risk-based capital requirements aﬀect risk tak-
ing when banks are able to engage in risk management and when capital
requirements are imperfectly enforced.
In our model at each audit date the bank chooses its level of capital
taking into account the constraints that RBCR place on its decisions. The
endogeneity of the bank’s capital decision, together with the opportunity for
insolvent banks to recapitalize25 are critical determinants of behavior and
diﬀerentiate our approach from much of the previous literature on RBCR
(see Rochet (1992), Marshal and Venkatarman (1999), Dangle and Lehar
(2003)).
The four panels of Figure (5) show the eﬀect of changing λ, the required
capital per unit of investment in the risky asset, on the four welfare function
variables: the bank’s choice of capital, k∗, the PVDIL, the probability of
default, π, and the average investment in the risky asset, Aw.
In our model and under both compliance regimes, a bank must be com-
pliant with RBCR at the time of an audit. It is important to stress that
the capital decision of the bank at this time is made jointly with its dy-
namic portfolio policy. Thus the capital decision will take into account the
opportunity that the bank will have to invest in the risky asset both (i) at
25Surprisedly, little research on banking treats either the level of capital or the franchise
value as endogenous and little research takes into account either the dynamic risk man-
agement or the options to recapitalize or close. An analysis of endogenous capital closely
related to our own is Froot and Stein (1998). They assume convex costs of capital is-
sue and examine the implications for bank risk management, capital structure and capital
budgeting. But they do not allow for bank regulation or deposit insurance and, since theirs
is a static model, they are unable to explore the potential implications of an endogenous
franchise value. Another is Milne and Whalley (2001) but they do not consider risk-based
capital requirements.
25the audit date and (ii) between audit dates where the latter depends on the
compliance regime.
Panel (a) shows the level of capital, k∗, under Lim-Cheat (dotted line) and
Ext-Cheat (solid line). With limited cheating, the banks choice of capital,
k∗, increases monotonically with the value of λ. In this case the initial capital
decision establishes a lower bound on the maximum exposure to the risky
asset up to the next audit date. For the parameters used in our calculations
(see Figure (5)) it is optimal for the bank to hold an amount of capital,
approximately26 equal to λ, that allows it to hold the maximum amount of
the risky asset. This result is robust for quite a wide range of parameter
values. The only parameter that has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the result is the
proportional cost of recapitalization, ν, and when this is high it leads the
shareholders to decide not to open the bank initially rather than to hold a
lower level of capital.
[Insert FIGURE (5) about here]
With extensive cheating, the capital decision is diﬀerent. When λ is below
a value of approximately 4%, i.e., when RBCR are relatively unburdensome,
it is again optimal for the bank to comply.
This occurs because our example considers only a limited number of port-
folio revision opportunities between audit dates and, in order to invest as
much as possible in the risky asset on the audit date (when the bank must
comply) the bank chooses a high level of capital. Clearly, if the frequency
of portfolio revision were higher (or if recapitalization costs were high), the
bank would reduce its level of initial capital.
When λ is above 4% the bank’s optimal strategy changes and it now
chooses a low level of capital and a lower investment in the risky asset on
the audit date. At ﬁrst sight the result that an increase in capital require-
ments results in both lower levels of capital and less investment in the risky
asset may be surprising. We might expect that increasing capital require-
ments would lead either to higher levels of capital and a maintained level
of investment in the risky asset or a maintained level of capital and a lower
investment in the risky asset.
This counterintuitive result comes about for the following reason. The
amount of capital, k, aﬀects the franchise value through the value of the
26The relationship between λ and k∗is not one-to-one because the former is the required
capital per unit invested in the risky asset and the later to is the amount of capital
expressed as a fraction of deposits. If 100% of the assets are invested in risky assets the
relation between the two is: k = λ/(1 − λ).
26deposit insurance put, the probability of default and the expected cost of
recapitalization. Increasing k allows the bank to increase its holding of the
risky asset but also increases the “strike” of the deposit insurance put and,
for this reason, an increase in k may either increase or decrease the value of
the deposit insurance put, the probability of default and the expected cost of
recapitalization. Therefore, the eﬀect of increasing k on the franchise value
may be either positive or negative.
In our example, increasing k leads to increases in the franchise value for
values of λ below around 4% but decreases for values above this level. The
threshold level where the bank’s policy changes – around 4% in this case – is
strongly related to the volatility of the risky asset, the frequency of portfolio
revision and the cost of recapitalization.
The eﬀect of changing the capital requirements parameter, λ, on the other
three welfare variables can be easily understood in terms of its eﬀect on k∗.
With Lim-cheat because, as the regulator would hope, higher RBCR in-
duce the bank to increase capital the average investment in the risky asset
(Aw), remains almost unchanged, the PVDIL and the probability of default
decreases monotonically with λ (as shown in Panels (b), (c) and (d). In
this case we also ﬁnd that the average investment in the risky asset is little
aﬀected by changes in λ.
With Ext-cheat, the results follow those for k∗ and fall into two regimes.
For low values of λ they mirror those for the Lim-cheat case since, in this
case, the bank chooses to comply. For higher values of λ, however, the bank
chooses a low level of capital. In this case the average investment in the risky
asset ﬁrst decreases and then remains unaﬀected by λ. Because both PVDIL
and the probability of default are insensitive to increases in λ, RBCR in this
case remain ineﬀective.
Our results emphasize that allowing for the behavioral response on the
part of banks in terms of capital and portfolio management is critical to a
proper evaluation of the eﬀects of changes in regulation (λ). In the QIS
carried out by the Basel Committee, the behavioral response was ignored.
Our results also show that the behavioral response itself depends on the way
the formal rules actually work in practice, i.e., the scope they give for banks
to cheat.
7 Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 (PCA)
The results on RBCR in the previous section are presented to provide a
benchmark against which to assess the role of Pillar 2/PCA when applied
27in conjunction with Pillar 1. We investigate this issue for the two cheating
regimes described and analyzed above.
Recall that, in our framework, Pillar 2/PCA acts as a minimum capital
requirement (  k) at the time of an audit, where   k > k, i.e., Pillar 2/PCA
maximum leverage is a more binding constraint on capital than the simple
solvency constraint k. Because it is independent of the composition of the
bank’s portfolio it therefore acts simply as a constraint on leverage. If a bank
violates the Pillar 2/PCA constraint27 at audit and chooses to recapitalize
it incurs a ﬁxed cost, C, in addition to the variable cost, ν, described earlier.
In our calculations,   k, the minimum capital level is set at 4%.
[Insert FIGURE (6) about here]
Figure (6) shows the eﬀect on the four output variables from changing
the required capital per unit of risky asset, λ, when Pillar 2/PCA is applied
in conjunction with RBCR.
When the level of compliance with RBCR is good (Lim-cheat) – see Panels
(a) - (d) – Pillar 2/PCA has relatively little eﬀect. For values of λ above
the threshold level   k the value of k∗ is driven by RBCR and is eﬀectively
unchanged from the result with Pillar 1 alone. The same applies to PVDIL
and the average investment in the risky asset. The frequency of default,
however, increases because the ﬁxed cost of recapitalization means that banks
will more often choose to close rather than recapitalize. Therefore, when
the level of compliance with RBCR is good, Pillar 2/PCA may actually
reduce welfare when it increases both banks’ costs (recapitalization) and the
probability of default.
For values of λ below the threshold level   k the latter becomes the eﬀective
minimum value of k∗. This is because when λ is below   k, and even if the bank
were to invest entirely in the risky asset, its required capital under RBCR
would be lower than   k. This is reﬂected in the behavior of k∗ (panel (a)),
PVDIL (panel (b)) and π (panel(c)) of Figure (6).
However Pillar 2/PCA plays a potentially important role with when com-
pliance with RBCR is poor (Ext-cheat). However, as we show, in this case
it acts more as a substitute for, rather than a complement to RBCR.
27The prompt corrective action scheme has been in eﬀect in the US since the passage
in 1991 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act. The scheme deﬁnes a series
of trigger points based on a bank’s capitalization and a set of mandatory actions for
supervisors to implement at each point. The series of actions that FDIC must implement
are detailed in the Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies. If a trigger point
are violated the ﬁrst action given in the manual is to require the bank to propose a capital
restoration plan. Our closure rule is designed to conform to the spirit of this requirement.
28The solid line in panel (e) of Figure (6) shows the value of k∗ under RBCR
from the earlier analysis. The minimum value of capital under Pillar 2/PCA
is   k and the dotted line in panel (e) shows that, in our example, this is also
the value of k∗ for all values of λ28.
Panel (e) shows that Pillar 2/PCA is successful in increasing the level
of capital that banks hold: in our example k∗ is higher for all value of λ
except 4% where it is the same. However, as Panel (e) also shows, with
poor compliance Pillar 2/PCA does not succeed in re-establishing the link
between actual bank capital and RBCR. In other words it does not correct
the ineﬀectiveness of RBCR that a poor compliance regime produces. Panel
(e) shows that the amount of capital that the bank holds is the same when
λ = 10% as it is when λ = 1%, even though the average risky asset holding
in the two cases diﬀers by only about 20%. Thus Pillar 2/PCA does not
complement RBCR in the sense of increasing the sensitivity of bank capital
to λ.
Panel (f) of Figure (6) shows that Pillar 2/PCA does indeed reduce the
PVDIL but, as with the level of capital, does so in a way that is almost
independent of λ. Comparing Panels (f) and (g) shows that this reduction in
PVDIL is not brought about by a reduction in the frequency of default (π)
but as a result of the higher level of capital that banks hold. This reduces
the average liability of the deposit insurer compared with the case without
Pillar 2. As just mentioned, Panel (g) shows that there is little eﬀect on
the probability of default (except for low values of λ) even though capital
levels are higher; this is a result of the ﬁxed cost of recapitalization that leads
banks to default more often. For low values of λ, particularly for values just
lower than the threshold value of 4%, banks hold more capital than without
Pillar 2/PCA and, again as a result of the ﬁxed cost of recapitalization, now
default more often.
Finally, Panel (h) shows that because it forces banks to hold more capi-
tal, for λ greater than around 4% Pillar 2/PCA allows them to increase the
amount they hold in the risky asset. For low values of λ the risky-asset hold-
ing is actually lower because the higher threshold level for recapitalization
28Two points related to   k in Panel (e) of Figure (6) should be noted. First, in our ex-
ample, the threshold level of around 4% for λ that induced a shift in portfolio composition
under RBCR happens in this case to be close to the value we have chosen for   k. This
means that in panel (e) of the Figure (6) the two lines coincide for a value of λ close to 4%.
Second, for values of   k that are suﬃcently low so that it is not a binding constraint for all
values of λ, the value of k∗ may diﬀter from the value obtained with Pillar 1 alone. The
reason is that, although, for some value of λ,   k may not be a binding constaint currently,
that fact that it may be a binding constraint in some future states of the worls may induce
a diﬀerent capital decision now.
29under Pillar 2/PCA means that when asset prices fall the bank reduces its
holding in the risky asset (i.e., initiates a ‘portfolio insurance’ policy) sooner.
8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the interaction between Pillar 1 (risk-based capital
requirements) and Pillar 2/PCA and, in particular, the role of closure rules
with costly recapitalization and where banks are able to manage their port-
folios dynamically.
In our analysis we make the perhaps extreme assumption that the only
source of rents in the banking system is deposit insurance. In a static setting,
we know from Merton’s (1977) model that banks will choose the portfolio
with the maximum risk. However, in a multiperiod setting, taking into ac-
count the possibility of costly recapitalization, banks have an incentive to
manage their portfolios dynamically. As a consequence the cost of deposit
insurance is aﬀected by the cost of recapitalization and its eﬀect on banks’
incentive to engage in risk management. In particular, the presence of costs
of recapitalization reduce the cost of deposit insurance but increase the prob-
ability of default.
A feature of our approach is to consider the costs as well as the beneﬁts of
capital regulation and to do so in a way that accommodates the behavioral
response of banks in terms of their portfolio strategy and capital structure
decisions and, further, the extent to which capital rules are eﬀective, i.e., the
extent to which banks can “cheat”.
We measure the eﬀects of capital regulation, for both Pillars 1 and 2,
in terms of four output variables that we use as proxies for the costs and
beneﬁts – both private and social – of capital regulation.
Without cheating the problem of bank capital adequacy is relatively mi-
nor and is related largely to discontinuity in asset prices that would lead to
diﬃculties in implementing a “stopping” policy. However the regulator faces
a much more diﬃcult problem when banks are able to deviate signiﬁcantly
from capital adequacy. Thus, the extent of banks’ ability to cheat is funda-
mental to the analysis of capital requirements. For this reason in our analysis
we consider two cases, one with extensive cheating and the other with only
limited cheating.
Or results fall into two parts. First, in order to establish a benchmark for
assessing the eﬀect of Pillar 2/PCA, we analyze the eﬀect of RBCR in our
model with imperfect compliance but without Pillar 2/PCA intervention. In
the second part we introduce Pillar 2/PCA.
30Without Pillar 2/PCA, we ﬁnd that even when banks’ compliance is
relatively good (limited cheating) RBCR may nonetheless be eﬀective in the
sense that, for higher levels of RBRC banks do indeed hold higher amounts of
capital. As result, (i) the PVDIL is lower and (ii) the probability of default
is also lower. Moreover, we also ﬁnd that in this case, an increase in RBCR
does not reduce the volume of risky assets that a bank is willing to hold (and
therefore there does not appear to be a signiﬁcant negative externality from
reduced bank activity).
However, when compliance is poor (extensive cheating) RBCR are inef-
fective in the sense that for higher levels of RBCR banks do not increase
their volume of capital. Consequently, increasing RBCR decreases neither
(i) the PVDIL nor (ii) the probability of default. Moreover, we ﬁnd that,
in this case, the volume of risky assets held by banks decreases as RBCR
increase because banks choose to increase their leverage rather than hold
higher volumes of both capital and risky assets.
The degree of compliance with RBCR is similarly crucial in assessing the
role of Pillar 2/PCA. If banks were to comply with RBCR continuously Pillar
2/PCA would be redundant. Only where there is the possibility of at least
some non-compliance does this type of intervention have a potential role.
We investigate this issue for the two cheating regimes considered in the
paper. With limited cheat Pillar 2/PCA has little eﬀect on the level of
capital that banks choose, the PVDIL or the average investment in the risky
asset. The frequency of default, however, increases. The potential role that
PVCA/Pillar 2 may play is as a complement to RBCR not as a substitute.
When level of compliance with RBCR is good Pillar 2/PCA may actually
reduce welfare because it increases both banks’ costs (recapitalization) and
the probability of default.
However Pillar 2/PCA plays a potentially important role with extensive
cheating although the results are complex. Introducing Pillar 2/PCA in-
creases the amount of capital that banks hold but does not result in a more
eﬀective RBCR regime in the sense that, even with Pillar 2/PCA, increasing
RBCR does not result in higher levels of capital. The same result applies
to the probability of default, the PVDIL and the average investment in the
risky asset. Introducing Pillar 2/PCA lowers PVDIL but, as before, increas-
ing RBCR does not further strongly reduce PVDIL. For the probability of
default the results are mixed but, once again, introducing Pillar 2/PCA does
not make the probability of default sensitive to the level of RBCR. The re-
sults on the average investment in the risky asset are similarly mixed but
the striking result is that, for higher levels of RBCR, the bank’s investment
in the risky asset decreases. In general, when extensive cheating is possi-
ble, Pillar 2/PCA does not complement RBCR in the sense of making them
31more eﬀective; rather, they act as a separate, “substitute” form of regulatory
control.
Because we ﬁnd that Pillar 2/PCA is most eﬀective in reducing the cost
of deposit insurance when compliance is relatively poor, we might infer from
the fact that (i) in the US, the FDIC has chosen to introduce PCA after
Basel I and (ii) the Basel Committee has included Pillar 2, that all these
regulators perceive the degree of compliance – for at least some banks – to
be relatively poor.
In making this observation it is important to bear in mind that our anal-
ysis suggests that, when the level of compliance is high, there may be few
beneﬁts to oﬀset the costs of Pillar 2PCA (the frictional costs of recapital-
ization).
Both these points suggest that future work in the area of RBCR should
pay more attention to compliance rather than simply the design of the rules.
Appendix
Proof of LEMMA 1:
Assuming that the risky asset distribution is lognormal and constant port-
folio proportion imply that:




(At − Dt − kD − S)f(At)dAt
Clearly this is the value of a call option; increasing the investment in the
risky asset the bank rises the volatility of the asset At and so the value of
equity (i.e. the value of the call option).
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Shareholders’ payoﬀ without the option to recapitalize



























Figure 2: Shareholders’ payoﬀ with the option to recapitalize
This Figure shows the shareholders’ payoﬀ at the next audit time under the
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Figure 3: Shareholders’ payoﬀ with proportional costs of recapital-
ization
This Figure shows the shareholders’ payoﬀ at the next audit time under the
option to recapitalize closure rule and proportional costs of recapitalization.






















Figure 4: Shareholders’ payoﬀ with ﬁx costs of recapitalization
This Figure shows the shareholders’ payoﬀ at the next audit time under the
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Figure 5: Pillar 1 - risk-based capital requirements
The Figure plots the eﬀect of changing the required capital per unit of investment in the
risky asset λ on the four welfare function variables: capital utilization k∗, Present Value
of Deposit Insurance Liabilities (PVDIL), probability of default π, the average investment
in risky asset Aw. The parameters used are: D = 100,   k = 1%, n = 4, r = 5%,
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Figure 6: Pillar 2/PCA
Under Pillar 2/PCA, the Figure plots the eﬀect of changing the required capital per
unit of investment in the risky asset λ on the four output variables: capital utilization
k∗, Present Value of Deposit Insurance Liabilities (PVDIL), probability of default π, the
average investment in risky asset Aw. The parameters used are: D = 100,   k = 4%, n = 4,
r = 5%, σ = 10%,v = 5%, C = 1.
41